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Abstract: The use of bounded rationality in explaining economic phenomena
has attracted growing attention. In spite of this, there is still considerable disagree-
ment regarding the meaning of bounded rationality. Basov (2005) argues that when
modeling boundedly rational behaviour it is desirable to start with an explicit for-
mulation of the learning process. A complete understanding of the boundedly ratio-
nal decision-making process requires development of an evolutionary-dynamic model
which can give rise to such learning processes. Evolutionary dynamics implies that
∗Author for correspondence
1individuals use heuristics to adjust their choices in light of past experiences, moving
in the direction that appears most beneﬁcial, where these adjustment rules are as-
sumed ‘hardwired’ into human cognition through the process of biological evolution.
In this paper we elaborate on the latter point by building a model of evolutionary
selection relevant to heuristics. We show that in addition to explaining the origin
of learning rules this approach also sheds light on some well documented preference
anomalies.
Keywords: Bounded Rationality, Heuristics, Replicator Dynamics
JEL Classiﬁcation: C0, D7
1 Introduction
Recently there has been a growing acceptance of the use of bounded rationality
models in explaining economic phenomena. For example Oﬀerman, Schram and
Sonnemans (1998) use a model of quantal response equilibrium to explain step-by-
step provision of public goods, while Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998, 2001) use
similar models to explain behaviour in all-pay auctions and coordination games. On
the subject of social learning Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) use
dynamic models based on gradual adjustment to explain the evolution of conventions.
Despite this growing reliance on models of boundedly rational behaviour there
is still considerable disagreement regarding the precise meaning of the term. Most
applied papers model bounded rationality as probabilistic choice using Luce’s (1959)
model and its extensions. Basov (2005) criticised this approach and argued that
when modeling boundedly rational behaviour it is desirable to start with an explicit
2formulation of the learning process. This, however, leaves open the question: What
determines the learning rule? A complete model of bounded rationality should
endogenise the entire decision-making process. Basov (2006) suggests using the
evolutionary-dynamic approach which states that individuals adjust their choices in
light of past experiences and move in the direction that appears most beneﬁcial.
This approach therefore assumes that the adjustment rules are themselves hardwired
into us through the process of biological evolution. In this paper we focus on the
latter point by building a model of evolutionary selection of heuristics that gives rise
to adjustment rules. In doing so we demonstrate that in addition to explaining the
origin of such rules this approach also sheds light on some well documented preference
anomalies.
The literature documenting preference anomalies has grown considerably over the
last 30 years. We focus brieﬂy on literature relevant to (i) the endowment eﬀect
and (ii) behaviour in public good games. For a broad collection and discussion of
behavioural anomalies see Thaler (1992).
The commonly observed endowment eﬀect, a pattern of behaviour ﬁrst formalised
by Thaler (1980), is the tendency for individuals to value a commodity (a good, a bun-
dle of goods or a bundle of lotteries) that they own more than an identical commodity
they could obtain through a transaction. The endowment eﬀect is one of several sug-
gested explanations behind the observed disparity between individuals’ ‘willingness
to pay’ (WTP) and ‘willingness to accept’ (WTA) measures of value (see Knetsch &
Sinden, 1984). This anomaly is most prevalent in contingent valuation settings, with
the robust result being that an individual’s stated WTA is frequently considerably
higher than their WTP for a commodity of identical value. For a comprehensive
3collection of empirical ﬁndings and associated discussion see Bateman, Kahneman,
Rhodes, Starmer and Sugden (2005), and Horowitz and McConnell (2002).
It is theoretically expected that the WTA and WTP measures of value be al-
most equivalent (barring unrealistically large income eﬀects). Despite controlling
for a range of possible causes including income eﬀects (Brookshire & Coursey, 1987);
learning eﬀects (Coursey, Hovis & Schulze, 1987); the eﬀect of incentives (Kahne-
man, Knetsch & Thaler, 1990); and the use of Vickery auctions (Coursey et al, 1987),
amongst others, the observed disparity persists.
Another persistent pattern of anomalous behaviour is observed in public good
experiments. In such experiments a group of k people are endowed with s dollars
each. They can contribute any amount between 0 and s into a common pool, the
sum total of which is then multiplied by some factor n < k and distributed equally
among all participants. It is clear that the dominant strategy is to contribute nothing
while an eﬃcient outcome involves contributing everything. Subjects tend to invest
40 − 60% of their endowment in the common pool. If subjects play this game
repeatedly the contribution rates tend to fall but nevertheless remain positive. For
a detailed review of such experiments see Thaler (1992).
This paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we provide some examples of
simple rule-based heuristics, while Section 3 demonstrates how two such heuristics
can explain several behavioural anomalies. In Section 4 we describe a general model
of heuristic evolution, while in Section 5 we assume environmental complexity changes
but at a rate slower than the characteristic time scale of heuristic evolution, leading
to the emergence of more sophisticated agents. Section 6 concludes with a summary
of results and a focus for further research.
42 Simple Heuristics
Our contention is that explaining certain behavioural anomalies is possible pro-
vided the idea of case-by-case optimisation is relaxed and instead one assumes that
individuals use simple rules of thumb, or heuristics, which are hardwired into our
instinctive cognition through the process of biological evolution. To clarify what is
meant by simple heuristics we provide the following examples:
Caution Heuristic Stick with the status quo when faced with a risky or unfa-
miliar decision, irrespective of the expected outcome of the risky proposition. For
example, if someone oﬀers to exchange your car for a much better looking example
for a modest sum (say only $100) you might instinctively decline the oﬀer and act
cautiously.
Recognition Heuristic Start with ordering the alternatives and choose the ﬁrst
alternative you recognise. For example, assume an investor orders stocks in some
random manner (i.e. alphabetically or by company announcements) and invests in
the ﬁrst stock they recognise.1 The probability an investor will invest in asset i
is determined by the ordering selected and by previous experience. If proﬁtable
ﬁrms advertise more than less proﬁtable ones, and the ordering is random, then the
probability of investment in a given stock will be increasing in its returns. Conversely,
if larger ﬁrms advertise more than smaller ones then the probability of investing in
a given stock will be increasing in the size of the ﬁrm and not necessarily in the
return on its stock.2 One can demonstrate that a portfolio constructed according
to this principle can perform quite well (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). Moreover, this
1The recognition heuristics is thoroughly discussed by Gigerenzer and Selten (2001).
2We use the recognition heuristic purely as an illustrative example and so ignore the possibility
of strategic interaction by ﬁrms in this environment.
5heuristic is shown to have evolutionary roots, in that rats tend to select foods the
smell of which they recognise over foods which they don’t, presumably to minimise
the chance of being poisoned (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001).
Select the Best Assume that each individual is endowed with a set of ‘keys’,
ordered in accordance to their ecological validity.3 In the previous stock market
example, assume that an investor is endowed with two keys: (i) whether the company
name appears in the Fortune 500 and (ii) whether their friend invested in the stock
of the same company.4 Given the Fortune 500’s construction as the 500 largest
American corporations, our individual will abandon their ﬁrst key in favour of their
second key assuming more than one company is listed. Relying on the second key
implies the investor consults a friend regarding their investment. If the friend invested
in a Fortune 500 company our individual does the same, if not they randomly choose
one of the 500 companies identiﬁed using their ﬁrst key. As in the previous example
this process will lead to some probability distribution over the investment in various
stocks.
Note that the ﬁrst three heuristics are static and can be used to explain initial
behaviour. The following two heuristics are dynamic and can be used to explain
behaviour across repetition.5
Tit-for-Tat Suppose you are confronted with a situation where repeated coop-
eration with another individual is required to achieve a common goal and where
cooperation is personally costly (thus refusing to do so is privately optimal). In
such cases you would ﬁnd yourself in a standard prisoner’s dilemma situation. The
3Ecological validity of a key is the fraction of the correct decisions made based on the value of
the key.
4For simplicity assume the friend invests solely in one company.
5Thus these heuristics can give rise to social learning.
6tit-for-tat strategy calls for cooperation in period one and in subsequent periods if,
and only if, your partner cooperates in each period before you.
Generalised Tit-for-Tat Suppose you are confronted with a situation resembling
a standard public good game (i.e. being asked to contribute to a common pool from
which all players will receive an even share). The generalised tit-for-tat strategy
calls for starting with a high contribution and increasing (decreasing) contributions
in subsequent periods provided your contribution is below (above) the mean group
contribution.
A commonality amongst the above mentioned heuristics is their optimality in
very speciﬁc cases. For example, the behaviour suggested by the Caution Heuristic
is justiﬁed provided there is a high chance of a ‘lemon oﬀer’ and information asymme-
tries are present, while Tit-for-Tat is the Nash equilibrium strategy in an inﬁnitely
repeated prisoner’s dilemma provided players have suﬃcient patience. The central
idea behind the heuristic approach is that once behaviour speciﬁed by a heuristic
becomes hardwired into cognition, individuals follow such rules in all situations, even
when such a strategy leads to sub-optimal payoﬀs. In other words, the heuristic
approach does not assume individuals possess any form of ‘cognitive override’ which
might correct such erroneous behaviour. If we evolved in a world where the chance
of receiving a lemon trade is high we will continue to decline risky proposals, even in
situations where the chance of getting a lemon trade is negligible, due to pessimism or
having ‘learnt the hard way’. If Tit-for-Tat (or indeed Generalised Tit-for-Tat) is a
good strategy in some social interactions, we may continue to follow such a strategy in
other games with diﬀerent structures, possibly relying on an obsolete or sub-optimal
rule.
7Observe that all ﬁve heuristics presented above are simple, i.e. they can be sum-
marised by a ‘rule of thumb’ and as such are assumed to incur zero complexity costs.
Conversely one might consider a more sophisticated heuristic. For example, when
faced with a choice under uncertainty one may use the Caution Heuristic if there are
three or more possible states of the world but compute the expected utility from each
state if faced with a binary choice. Such a heuristic is no longer rule based, thus
increasing its complexity, and as such an agent should incur some cost to develop the
relevant computational abilities to make such decisions.
A reasonable question to ask is: What determines the repertoire of heuristics
available to a given agent? Our answer: Evolution. To formalise this idea we
abandon the notion that individuals maximise on a case-by-case basis. Instead, we
specify a set of problems, Ω, an agent might face and assume there is a ﬁnite set
of heuristics, H, available to that agent. Agents are assumed to select a heuristic
hj ∈ H and apply it to all problems in Ω. This generates a payoﬀ π(hj,x) where
x = (x1,...,xH)6 and xi is the fraction of the population that uses heuristic hi. We
assume that the evolution of xi is described by the replicator dynamics and that the
distribution of heuristics in a given population corresponds to asymptotically stable
steady states of such dynamics.
3 Motivating Examples
The notion of a heuristics approach to decision-making is appealing due to its
intuitive foundations, as noted by Rosenthal (1992). It is diﬃcult to validate the
conviction that individuals possess the analytical skills to construct a model, assess
6With the standard abuse of notation we use H for both the set of heuristics and its cardinality.
8the relevant probabilities and ﬁnally maximise their utility criteria on a routine basis.
A far more realistic scenario is where an individual, faced with an unfamiliar and
uncertain decision, instinctively invokes a simple ‘rule of thumb’. Such a rule would
represent an accumulated pool of knowledge from similar past decisions, as well as
an instinctive assessment of the environment currently being confronted.
Example 1 Caution Heuristic Consider a large but ﬁnite population of risk-
neutral7 individuals faced with a family of problems, P. Each problem p ∈ P can be
represented as a choice between two actions: safe and risky. The safe choice results
in a certain payoﬀ πH while the risky choice is represented as a binary lottery:
πl with probability γ
πh with probability 1 − γ
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and πl ￿= πh. The payoﬀs and probabilities vary from problem to
problem and we assume that there are problems p1,p2 ∈ P such that
γ(p1)π
l(p1) + (1 − γ(p1))π
h(p1) > πH(p1) (1)
γ(p2)π
l(p2) + (1 − γ(p2))π
h(p2) < πH(p2) (2)
i.e. for some problems the safe option is the optimal choice and for others the risk is
worth taking. Furthermore we assume that making always the safe choice is better
than making always the risky choice.
Suppose that there are two types of individuals; naifs and sophisticates.8 Naifs
7Risk neutrality is assumed purely for simplicity. A similar analysis could be conducted incor-
porating risk aversion.
8We borrow this terminology from O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) but adopt a literal interpreta-
tion in that sophisticates are more congnitively advanced than naifs.
9must restrict themselves to the same choice for all problems. Given our assumptions
on the payoﬀs, they will eventually learn to rely on the Caution Heuristic, i.e. will
always take the safe option. The sophisticates, on the other hand, solve this problem
using standard expected utility theory (EUT).9 We assume that in order to develop
mental capacities necessary to apply EUT individuals incur some cost, τ (such a cost
could be biological in nature, i.e. extra metabolic requirements necessary to support
advanced cognition, or simply the opportunity cost of ones time taken to learn the new
technique). Once the necessary mental capacity is developed we assume sophisticates
can apply this method costlessly in future situations. It is straightforward to show
that in the long-run the population will develop sophistication provided
τ > E(πEUT) − E(πH) (3)
and rely on the Caution Heuristic otherwise. Expectations in (3) are taken over all
problems in P. This model can be enriched to allow for the expected payoﬀs of a
particular strategy to depend on the fraction of the population which already utilise
that strategy. In such cases the long-run result could be a non-trivial mix of naifs
and sophisticates within a given population.
The above example can be used to explain the endowment eﬀect. We deﬁne the
endowment eﬀect as the tendency for individuals to value a commodity they own
more than an identical one they could obtain through a market transaction. In a
typical experiment to demonstrate the endowment eﬀect mugs bought at a university
shop are distributed randomly among participants. Those who received a mug are
9One should not assume that these agents possess enough sophistication to solve any problem
using EUT - They just possess enough sophistication to apply EUT to binary choices.
10asked about the minimal price at which they would be willing to part with the mug
(WTA), while those who did not receive a mug are asked about the maximal price
at which they would be willing to buy the mug (WTP). A consistent experimental
ﬁnding is that WTA > WTP. To explain this result under assumptions of perfect
rationality one must either assume unreasonably large income eﬀects or postulate a
direct preference for endowment.
We argue, however, that neither is necessary if one gives up the idea that choices
should be rationalised on a case-by-case basis. One should rather imbed the mug
problem into a class of problems in which sticking with your endowment is the sensible
thing to do, on average, by invoking the Caution Heuristic. Such a class of decision
problems might spring to mind if mugs are replaced by used cars. It is easy to justify
a higher asking price by an individual selling a car versus a lower bidding price by
an individual looking to purchase the same car since this is exactly the situation on
the ‘lemon market’ for used cars (see Akerlof, 1970).
Example 2 Generalised Tit-for-Tat Consider a standard public good game
where k subjects are given s dollars each and where they must decide on what amount
x ∈ [0,s] to contribute to a common pool. The contributions to the common
pool are multiplied by some constant n < k and distributed equally between all
participants. It is clear that the dominant strategy in this game is to contribute
nothing since for each dollar you contribute you get only n/k < 1 dollars back.
Numerous experiments (see Thaler, 1992), however, report that individuals start
with suﬃciently high contributions which tend to decrease over time.
Again, under assumptions of perfect rationality, it is hard to explain such behav-
iour. However, the explanation is rather straightforward if we assume that individuals
11imbed such situations into a broad class of cooperation games and apply or adapt
some rules that work well in typical cooperation environments. Many cooperation
games can be modelled as a repeated prisoner’s dilemma. An extremely successful
strategy (in evolutionary terms) in this setting is Tit-for-Tat, which calls for cooper-
ation in period one and in subsequent periods if, and only if, your partner cooperates
each period before you (see Axelrod, 1984). One can adapt such a strategy for the
above game to imply; start with a high contribution and increase (decrease) your
choice in subsequent periods if your contribution is below (above) the population
mean. Formally, the contributions of agent i who follows the generalised tit-for-tat
strategy will evolve according to:
xit+1 = xit + γ(zt − xit) (4)
where zt is the mean population contribution, xit is the contribution of agent i at
time t and γ ∈ (0,1) is some constant. If the entire population follows rule (4) then







where N is the number of agents. It is straightforward to see that the unique solution
of (4) for given initial contributions is:
zt = z0, xit = z0 + (1 − γ)
t(xi0 − z0), (6)
where xi0 and z0 are initial contributions of agent i and the initial population mean
respectively. Therefore, if everyone in the population follows the generalised tit-for-
12tat strategy, the average contribution remains constant while individual contributions
revert to the population mean. Now assume that there is a fraction ρ ∈ (0,1) of
sophisticates who ‘ﬁgure out’ the game and contribute nothing in each round. Then
equation (4) will describe the evolution of contributions of the naifs and equation (5)







One can solve for the mean population contribution of the naifs in this case to obtain
zt = (1 − ρ)z0 + z0ρ(1 − γ)
t (8)
Note that the average contributions deteriorate over time but remain positive, which
is consistent with experimental evidence. The individual contributions now follow:





The behaviour of naifs in this example is hard to explain looking at the payoﬀs of any
particular game in isolation, however such behaviour makes perfect sense if viewed
as a simple response to a generalised cooperation environment.
4 The General Model
In this section we present a general model of heuristics evolution. Consider
a population of individuals who are repeatedly faced with a set of problems, P, to
solve. They have a ﬁnite set of H heuristics available to use. Heuristic h ∈ H applied
to a problem p ∈ P produce a solution s(h,p) ∈ Sp, where Sp denotes the set of all
13feasible solutions to problem p. The expected payoﬀ this solution generates for an
individual is π(s,x), where x = (x1,...,xH) and xh is the fraction of the population
using heuristic h. We will endow P with a structure of measure space (P,Σ,µ),
where Σ is a sigma-algebra of subsets of P, µ is a probability measure on Σ, and for
∀B ∈ Σ we assume with probability µ(B) an individual encounters problem p ∈ B.




π(s(h,p),x)dµ(p) − c(h), (10)
where c(h) is the complexity cost associated with heuristic h. The average payoﬀ of





We assume that the rate of change of the fraction of a population that follows heuristic
h ∈ H is proportional to the diﬀerence between the expected payoﬀ an individual
receives using heuristic h and the mean population payoﬀ, i.e.
dxh
dt
= ηxh(U(h,x) − U(h)), (12)
where η > 0.
Equation (12) has the same form as the replicator equation in evolutionary game
theory.10 Interpretation in this case is, however, diﬀerent. While in evolutionary
game theory one usually restricts attention to a particular game and studies the
10There is, however, a slight formal diﬀerence since we do not require U(r,x) to be polylinear in
x. Complexity costs present an obvious reason to violate such a condition.
14evolution of strategies, in this case we are interested in the evolution of rules, which
can be applied in a variety of diﬀerent situations (i.e. diﬀerent games). For example,
the Caution Heuristic can be applied in the mug experiment and in the market for
used cars while Generalised Tit-for-Tat can be used in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma
and in public good games.





xh = 0 (13)
Therefore, if fractions of a population playing diﬀerent strategies initially sum to
one, they will continue to do so at any other time. Note also that xh = 0 implies
dxh/dt = 0, i.e. if xh(0) > 0 it will remain non-negative at all times. Consequentially
system (12) conﬁnes the dynamics of x to the unit simplex.
Our next objective is to analyse the steady states of system (12) and their associ-
atedstability. Let us formallyconsider a non-cooperative game G = ({Sα}α∈C,{uα}α∈C,C)
in which each player has a strategy set Sα = H. Players have Bernoulli utility
uα : ∆(H) × H → R where C is the set of all players and where
uα(h,x) = U(h,x) (14)
A non-standard feature of this formulation is that the payoﬀ to a player who adopts a
particular strategy depends on population averages rather than on the strategy proﬁle
of opponents. For this reason it is proper to think of the interaction between players
as being conducted jointly at a population-wide level in a way that does not lend
15itself to modelling with interaction among a randomly selected group of players.11 A
crucial observation, however, is that the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of a player






where U(x,y) is linear in y.12 It is now straightforward to deﬁne a Nash equilibrium





for all y ∈ ∆(H). The standard results of evolutionary game theory (see Weibull,
1995) can now be applied.
Result 1 Any Lyapunov stable state of system (12) is a Nash equilibrium of G.
In our case this implies that if a mix of heuristics used by the population is stable,
it is impossible to outperform an average member of the population using heuristics
from the same repertoire. Note, however, that this result does not imply that the
heuristics repertoire that emerges in equilibrium will allow one to obtain the maximal
possible payoﬀ for any problem in P. Instead it simply implies that it is impossible
to get systematically higher payoﬀs using heuristics from set H.
Result 2 Any strict dominant strategy is a globally attractive steady state.
Result 3 Any interior Nash equilibrium (if such exists) is reachable, i.e. there
exists an initial steady state from which the system will eventually converge to. This
11For other interesting applications of population-wide models see Hansen and Kaarbøe (2002).
12We implicitly assume that C has cardinality of continuum and therefore the strategy choice of
one player does not disturb the population mean.
16means that the issue of equilibrium selection, familiar to game theorists, arises here.13
Such a problem of equilibrium selection is relevant only if one insists that prediction
of a theory should correspond to an equilibrium point and that dynamics are at best
an aid in selecting such a point. We, on the contrary, take dynamics seriously as
describing the evolution of human behaviour over time. In this case, multiplicity of
equilibria can be an asset rather than liability, since it allows us to study how chosen
heuristics were shaped by real evolutionary processes.
5 Changing Environments and the Evolution of
Complexity
Let us now assume that time passes in discreet periods and that during each
period the set of problems is Pn where n ∈ N. We will assume that Pn ⊂ Pn+1
and interpret problems Pn+1\Pn as more complex than those in Pn (for example, the
evolution of society and technology brings forth new challenges). We also assume
that the sets of heuristics {Hk}
p
k=1 are ordered in such a way that all heuristics in
the same set Hk have the same complexity cost ck and that ck+1 > ck. Moreover, we
assume that for ∀n ∈ N ∃k(n) ∈ N : ∃h ∈ Hk(n) such that
π(s(h,p),x) ≥ π(s
∗,x) for ∀s
∗ ∈ Sp,∀p ∈ Pn (17)
In words, this means that for any problem set Pn there is a sophisticated enough
heuristic which can solve all problems in Pn optimally, net of complexity costs. It is
13Recent literature has shown that adding noise does not solve this problem, since the exact
equilibrium selected depends on the way the noise is added. For population-wise games this was
ﬁrst demonstrated by Hansen and Kaarbøe (2002).
17natural to assume that the heuristics sets k(n) are increasing in n and that individuals






This amounts to saying that environments of higher order n are more complex. It is
important to note that we do not assume that every problem in Pn+1 is necessarily
more complex than any problem in Pn. We only assume that a universal algorithm to
ﬁnd the optimal solution for any problem in Pn+1 is more complex than a universal
algorithm to ﬁnd the optimal solution for any problem in Pn. Therefore, it is quite
possible that most individuals are able to ﬁnd the optimal solution to a complex
problem in Pn (e.g. to manage running a marathon), but are unable to solve a simple
problem in Pn+1 (e.g. how much to save for retirement given time-preferences and
market interest rates). Finally, we assume that each period is suﬃciently long such
that we can concentrate on the long-run dynamics of system (12).















π(s(h,p),x)dµ(p) − cm+1) (19)
It is strictly stable if the above inequality is strict.
Before proceeding further let us consider a simple example.
18Example 3 Suppose environment P is such that individuals are called repeat-
edly to choose one of three outcomes. The utilities of each outcome are independently
distributed according to the uniform distribution on [0,1]. Three available heuristics
sets H0,H1,H2 are all singletons. Set H0 = {h0} is “choose the ﬁrst option you
encounter.” The evolutionary cost associated with this set is 0. If we assume that
the order in which the options are encountered is uncorrelated with the payoﬀs then








Set H1 = {h1} is “choose a pair of options at random, compare the utilities and choose
the best” (this heuristic is sophisticated enough to compare a pair of options but not
sophisticated enough to store the results). The evolutionary cost associated with this








Finally, set H2 = {h2} is “choose a pair of options at random, compare the utilities,
remember the best, compare with the remaining options, and choose the best,” (this
heuristic allows for short term memory and is sophisticated enough to always lead to
the optimal choice in environment P).14 The evolutionary cost associated with this
set is c2 and the expected utility attained by the individuals who use this heuristic is




14It is wrong, however, to identify agents that use such a heuristic as ‘utility maximising’. This
is because heuristic H2 will fail to maximise utility in a choice between four or more alternatives.
19If c1 ≥ 1
6 then the evolutionary stable set is H0, if c1 ≤ 1
6 and c2 ≥ 1
12 then the evolu-
tionary stable set is H1 and if c2 ≤ 1
12 (which implies c1 < 1
12) then the evolutionary
stable set is H2.
Let us return to the general characterisation of evolutionary stable steady states.



















π(s(h,p),x)dµ(p) < 0 (24)
Then for any n there are only ﬁnitely many evolutionary stable steady states.









π(s(h,p),x)dµ(p) ≥ cm − cm−1 > 0 (25)
Conditions (23) - (24) imply that there are only ﬁnitely many solutions to (25) ￿
Note that if multiple steady states exist then those with the lowest complexity
are more likely to be observed since they require a smaller number of simultaneous
mutations. Our assumption regarding the gradual acquisition of heuristics repertoires
implies that the evolution of set Hk to Hk+n requires n simultaneous mutations. The
implication of this result is that a population can be trapped in a state with relatively
low complexity even though a higher degree of complexity might have been beneﬁcial.
206 Conclusions
Empirical work using experiments has uncovered numerous behavioural anom-
alies; two such examples being the endowment eﬀect and public good contributions.
An attempt to understand such anomalies on the basis of case-by-case optimisation
inevitably leads to the postulation of non-standard preferences (e.g. preferences be-
ing expressed in changes rather than levels or kinked utility functions at the point of
endowment). We argue that such modiﬁcations are unnecessary if one abandons the
assumption of case-by-case optimisation and instead embraces holistic optimisation.
The holistic optimisation approach proposes that individuals apply simple heuris-
tics to a wide variety of decision problems. Solutions generated by such rules need
not be optimal on a case-speciﬁc basis, however they should on average dominate the
solutions generated by alternative and feasible rules. The appropriate criterion for
evaluation of such rules is evolutionary ﬁtness. Given reasonable assumptions, such
an environment can be represented under the expected utility framework (see Rob-
son, 2001), net of complexity costs. Under a rule-based system of problem-solving
(governed by evolutionary dynamics) no ad hoc modiﬁcations to preferences, such as
those advocated by many behavioural economists, are necessary.
The ideas set forward in this paper can be further developed in two directions.
Firstly, one can study more carefully real evolutionary environments in which hu-
mans have developed to shed light on the actual set of heuristics commonly used in
economic decision-making. Secondly, one can use reduced-form models of human be-
haviour that arise from this heuristics approach to rationalise economic phenomena.
As argued in Basov (2005, 2006) such reduced-form models should assume that an
individual’s choices follow a Markov process over some state space.
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